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Abstract
This paper assesses the effectiveness of the “maternity capital” subsidy by estimating the changes
in consumption patterns of families with two children in the Russian Federation between 2000-
2016. The main focus is on the housing and education expenditures as they represent two main
ways of current usage of the subsidy. The research covers four different time periods of families
with two children, which are expenditures in the first year after the second child’s birth and the three
consecutive years. I found that the subsidy decreases the housing expenditures by 18.4 percent and
increases the education expenditure by 63 percent at the year of the second child’s birth using the
Difference-in-Difference method.
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11 Introduction
The necessity to achieve a larger population led the government of the Russian Federation in 2007
to follow a pronatalist policy. This policy is aimed to encourage the birth rate and often is carried
out by subsidy provisions and tax benefits for families with children. On the one hand, such
fiscal instruments mitigate differences between households in the number of children, since having
an additional child means increased costs. On the other hand, these instruments work as a tool
against the aging population problem, as the increase in the number of newborns will decrease the
proportion of people over 60 to the overall population.
In this paper, I focus on the Russian pronatalist reform implemented in 2007. According to
this reform, a woman who gives birth to second, third or subsequent child starting from January 1,
2007, is provided with one-time “maternity capital” lump-sum subsidy. “Maternity capital” is the
amount of money equivalent to 10,000 U.S. dollars, indexed to inflation. It is given in the form of a
certificate once only for a family and can be requested when the child reaches the age of three. Only
parents holding Russian citizenship and giving a birth to a child, registered as a Russian citizen,
are eligible to receive the subsidy. This certificate can be used for any of the following purposes:
housing conditions improvement (investment in living space located in Russia, or payments of
the mortgage loan), mother’s pension savings, or children’s education (Federal’nyy zakon 2006).
Since the first introduction of the “maternity capital” subsidy a series of amendments have been
made. For instance, from 2009 families having the mortgage can use the subsidy for mortgage
payments without waiting for 3 years (Federal’nyy zakon 2008, Federal’nyy zakon 2010). From
2010 subsidy can be used for the construction of housing without the involvement of construction
firms (Federal’nyy zakon, 2010). The program was intended to terminate on December 31, 2016.
2However, later on, it was extended until the end of 2021.
By the end of 2016, the government of the Russian Federation issued 7.6 million certificates.
Approximately 55 percent of those eligible for subsidies fully used the provided financial aid, and
6 percent used it partially (Pensionnyy fond Rossiyskoy Federatsii 2016). Cases of unredeemed
certificates are usually associated with the presence of bureaucratic and legislative barriers (Boroz-
dina 2016). By 2016, 91.4 percent of certificate-owners used their subsidies to improve living
conditions. However, starting from 2013, a number of households changed their preferences and
used the aid to cover educational costs of their children. Annually this number grows by 26.8
percent (Pensionnyy fond Rossiyskoy Federatsii 2016).
Figure 1: Crude birth rate starting from the 1st child. Data source: RLMS
As reported by Figure 1, births rates remained at high levels for the first seven years starting
from 2000, namely, the number of births annually rose by 38,000 babies. The reason is proba-
bly related to the increase in a number of women of child-bearing age in 2000 - 2005. This is
represented by a big cohort of girls born in between 1982 and 1987, one of the high fertility pe-
riods in Russia, who attained full legal age. Also, families had an opportunity to give birth to the
planned children, whose birth were postponed due to the economic crisis of the 90s. From 2007
3to 2010 number of births substantively raised in comparison to previous periods. According to
the opinion of Russian analysts, this rise is associated with the pronatalist reforms introduced in
2007. Statistics show the implementation of the “maternity capital” subsidy, which is the part of
the pronatalist reform, resulted in an annual increase in births by 60,000 babies, which is 1.5 times
as much as in 2000 - 2007 (Bashkin 2016). In addition, it reduced the interval between the births
(Slonimczyk and Yurko 2014). However, despite the baby boom, the fertility rate was declining
from 2010, which was also associated with the decreasing number of fertile-aged people (Frejka
2012) and the persistence of two-child family ideology, other macroeconomic and social effects.
This also coincided with the increase in a number of requests for the “maternity capital” subsidy
use (Terentyev et al. 2015). Figure 1 confirms that the negative trend in birth rates remains the
same, even if there was a strong growth between 2007 and 2010.
According to Figure 2, the number of births after the first child declined significantly in 2006,
a period when a decision of upcoming reform was announced. Starting from 2007 to 2010, the
number of the second and subsequent newborns increased. Since 2006, people could be deferring
childbearing in anticipation of the policy. The presence of a gap between 2006 and 2007 can be
considered as an effect of the policy.
In this paper, I focus on families with one or two children. Since the subsidy cannot be re-
deemed until the second child turns three, I estimate the change in housing and education-related
expenditures for families who expect to receive 10,000 USD maternity capital after the birth of the
second child. I consider spending on housing and education as they represent two main ways of
current usage of the subsidy. It is likely that the policy will adjust the shares devoted to raising
a child, especially because the majority of recipients choose to spend the subsidy on purchasing
accommodation (Pensionnyy fond Rossiyskoy Federatsii 2016). This means that the increase of
4Figure 2: Crude birth rate starting from the 2nd child. Data source: RLMS
the budget share on housing or education expenditures will be compensated by the subsidy. Subse-
quently, information obtained about the costs will allow us to determine whether there is a change
in the consumption pattern of families.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an introduction to the family policy
in Russia. Section III is devoted to the brief overview of previous works and studies concerned
with the effect of family subsidies on fertility and consumption. Section IV provides a detailed
description of the data and variables used in the analysis. Section V presents a description of both
econometric models and methodology. Section VI represents the estimation results of the analysis.
Section VII concludes the study and proposes the further discussion on this topic.
2 Family policy in Russia
The Russian system of family policy and key issues regarding the institution of the family have
been regulated by the “Russian Federation Family Code” since 1 March 1996 (in addition to extra
5concepts and laws1). Years ago a provision of targeted assistance for the low-income families was
used as a main tool of the family policy. However, due to the persistence of the negative trend
in fertility, starting from 2005, the government introduced a number of innovations into existing
family-related support measures (Yelizarov 2011). A description of the main changes implemented
in the family policy is presented below.
The improved family policy system uses a mechanism of allowances indexation, which adjusts
the amount of the benefits for inflation. Also, it provides mothers with parental leave allowances
regardless of their working status. Parental leave starts right after the end of maternity leave and
lasts until the child reaches the age of three. For the first 18 months of parental leave, mothers
are provided with benefits. However, the amount of available allowances for a working mother is
higher. The non-working mother is able to get a fixed amount of childbirth allowance, which is 26
USD (1,500 rubles) for the first child, and 53 USD (3,000 rubles) for the second and subsequent
children. The same financial assistance for a working mother is 40 percent of her wage and is
limited by regulations. The lower limit of allowance cannot be less than the amount provided to
a non-working mother, the upper limit is 105 USD (6,000 rubles). For the next 18 months, the
government supplies only 50 rubles (about 0.70 USD) per month in total per family, which has a
very low monetary value today. This type of payment was established in 1994 and has not been
adjusted for inflation.
The system of maternity leave provides women with 20 or 28 paid weeks: 20 when the mother
gives birth to one child, and 28 when the mother gives birth to twins or more. The amount of
allowance is based on the average wage rate of a mother for the last two years and ranged between
1The “Family Policy Concept” from 12 May 1993, the federal law “On State benefits to citizens with children”
from 19 May 1995, and the “National Plan of Action for Children” from 14 September 1995.
687 USD (6,204 rubles) and 3,491 USD (248,164.38 rubles) in 2016. Women are protected from
termination of employment during the maternity leave. Mothers completing vocational training
and university studies are also eligible for maternal leave benefits, but the amount of benefits for
them is significantly less.
The system of lump-sum assistance consists of different types of payments, such as a one-time
payment in respect of a child’s birth, a “childbirth medical voucher”, a “maternity capital”, etc.
The one-time payment is equivalent to 284.3 USD (6,350.33 rubles) and is paid for each live birth
to either the mother or father, regardless of social status and occupational category. The voucher
is a part of a governmental “The Health” program aimed to ensure that mothers in the prenatal,
perinatal and neonatal period will have access to high-quality medical services. The nominal value
of this benefit is 194 USD (11,000 rubles), which consists of three coupons. The first coupon
covers services on antenatal care in the amount of 53 USD (3,000 rubles), the second pays for the
maternity home services in the amount of 105 USD (6,000 rubles), the third one - for two medical
check-ups of a child in the amount of 18 USD (1,000 rubles) per each visit. Money provided can
be used to cover medical expenses at any hospital that the mother prefers. The only requirement
to get the voucher for women with Russian citizenship is to have at least 12 weeks of continuous
visits to doctors during the pregnancy period.
Another tool of the family policy is a provision of tax deductions for parents. The government
offers two types of tax allowances - social (for education and medical treatment of a child) and
standard. Standard allowance implies a reduction in the taxable income of the parents by 295 USD
(16,800 rubles) for the first child, and by 632 USD (36,000 rubles) for each subsequent child. The
social allowance reduces the taxable income by the amount equivalent to the parent’s spending on
medicine, medical services for children, and education of a child to the age of 24. Both types of
7allowance have different upper limits. Additional types of governmental assistance are aimed to
support only socially vulnerable members of society and provided to parents of children aged three
and older.
The presence of additional support for families with children listed above makes the task of
disentangling the effect of “maternity capital” from the parental leave benefits difficult. However,
in this paper, I make the same assumption as Slonimczyk and Yurko (2014), that an increase in
parental leave allowances was not significant.
3 Literature review
Many researchers have investigated the effect of subsidies on fertility. Among the studies con-
ducted on micro-level data, subsidies and other financial incentives are found to have a notable
positive effect on decisions regarding whether or not to have subsequent children (for instance, see
Laroque and Salanie 2008, Ekert-Ja e et al. 2002, Milligan 2005, etc.). Boccuzzo et al. (2008) in-
vestigate the effect of a postponed lump-sum child subsidy, which has similarities to the “maternity
capital”, on fertility decisions. This research focuses on the birth bonus system in Friuli-Venezia
Giulia (Italy) and confirms that “baby bonuses” positively impact fertility among women with
low-income levels and low education level. Also, they claim that in response to the subsidy, the
probability of abortions decreases. Studies based on macro-level data have mixed results. For
instance, Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) consider time series data from 1970 to 1990 from 22 coun-
tries. The authors examine two types of models: the first covers all the countries and the second -
particular cohorts within those countries. They conclude that both models demonstrate an insignif-
icant real effect of cash transfers on fertility. In contrast, analysis of the dynamics of the birth rates
8in Britain (Ermisch 1988) results in the opposite, namely, an increase of child allowances raise the
likelihood of third and fourth births. Also, generous subsidies stimulate women to give birth at
younger ages.
Several studies assess the impact of the maternity capital reform on changes in birth rates and
birth intervals in Russia. Brainerd et al. (2007) point out that the underlying reasons for declining
total fertility rates in Russia beginning in the 1990s are related to a decrease in income, declining
marriage rates and an increase in unemployment. Such findings, in turn, emphasize the importance
of financial subsidies in stimulating the birth rate. Slonimczyk and Yurko (2014) focus on fertility
and labor force participation. Estimates of a dynamic structural model let to the conclusion that
policy has a positive impact on fertility. A study by Chirkova (2013) confirms the results of the
previous research. The author shows that the changes in family policy increase the probability of
giving birth to a second child by 2,2 percent on average. Moreover, the author points out that the
effect of the reform is defined mainly by the low-educated women. Also, depending on the gender
of the first child the probability of having a second child differs, which is called child gender
preference. Finally, for families with restricted living conditions, the effect of the policy is minor.
Both studies use Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). In contrast to previous studies,
Kopeykina (2017) finds that maternity capital assistance has not changed the reproductive behavior
of prospective parents. She estimates the effect of the subsidy on an interval between bearing the
first and second child. According to results neither the time of transition nor the overall risk of
bearing a second child change. Frejka and Zakharov (2012) show that in the post-reform period
the fertility rate of second and subsequent births increases, but the ratio of transition to motherhood
decreases. Moreover, the authors say that only the timing of births is affected. People change their
preference in terms of the timing by giving higher order births earlier than they planned, but there
9is no effect in terms of the number of children.
However, little research has been carried out concerning the effect of the subsidy on consump-
tion behavior of households. One example is a paper by Forry (2009). She claims that the provision
of childcare allowances releases financial burdens of low-income families. Specifically, mothers’
out-of-pocket costs and share of household income devoted to child care decrease by 250 USD
and by 10 -14 percent, respectively. Another example is an article by Jones et al. (2015). Using
Canadian expenditure surveys for twelve years, the authors examine the effect of various child cash
benefits on total family costs and changes in the probability of consumption of various goods and
services. The findings indicate a rise in expenditures on child care, education, groceries, rent, and
transportation, along with a fall in consumption of tobacco, alcohol and eating out. The authors
claim that children, directly and indirectly, benefit (through “resource channel” and the “family
process channel”) from such shifts in expenditures.
To sum up, the effectiveness of the family subsidies should be investigated from different points
of view, as they affect different aspects of human life. Since there have been no studies concerning
the effect of “maternity capital” on consumption using the case of the Russian Federation, my
paper contributes to the empirical literature.
4 Data
For this study the data was retrieved from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS),
a nationally representative survey covering the period from 1994 up to 2016. The survey was
conducted by the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Institute for Health
Metrics and Evaluation, Carolina Population Center, the University of North Carolina at Chapel
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Hill, and the Institute of Sociology in the Russian Academy of Sciences. The survey aims to
evaluate the impact of government reforms on both economic and health situations in Russia. It
provides detailed information on the characteristics of communities, households, and individuals.
In addition, the survey includes information on an individual level such as labor market participa-
tion, earnings, and education of adults as well as household level such as family expenditures and
others. The survey was conducted in twenty-five rounds and included 10,000 individuals out of
4,000 households in each round. The committee selected representative 32 oblasts and 7 districts
including St.Petersburg, Moscow city, and oblast.
This panel data provides an opportunity to observe family consumption decisions, changes in
individual and household characteristics. Following the same individuals for over 16 years results
in attrition of original sample size and unbalanced panel data. This means that the number of
households from the representative sample decreased every period. For example, the number of
interviewed households declined by almost 12 percent in rural, and by 15 percent in urban areas
from 2000 to 2005. In order to preserve representativeness of the sample, every year the committee
included new households instead of families who dropped out.
For this study, I use longitudinal data from rounds IX - XXV covering the period from 2000 to
2016. I focus on families with mothers aged 18 - 50 years having at least one child at the time of
the survey between 2000 and 2013. Mothers having one or two children are followed for the four-
year period starting from the birth of the child. Mothers with three or more children are followed
only for four years after the birth of the second child. I follow mothers for the four years because
I aim to investigate the effect of the “maternity capital” on housing and education consumption of
eligible families in expectation of the subsidy. The cases of multiple births and birth intervals less
than four years between the second and third child are excluded from the sample. Mothers who
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gave birth to the second child since 1 January 2007 are regarded as the holders of a right for the
“maternity capital” subsidy and comprise the group of interest.
Maternity capital is paid in a lump-sum to mothers of the second and subsequent children
in three years after the child’s birth. Maternity capital can be spent on housing improvements,
children’s education, and mother’s retirement savings. The literature reports that less than 1 percent
of “maternity capital” subsidy fund was used for mother’s pension savings until 2016 (Annual
Report, 2016). Moreover, there is a no data on pension contributions and annual savings in RLMS
survey. Also, by now there exist time constraints, which do not allow researchers to observe
mothers, who devoted their subsidy on pension savings, at years after they retire. Thus, I focus
my attention on two other categories of expenditures allowed by the subsidy policies: housing and
children’s education.
A description of all the variables used in the analysis is presented in Table 2 (Appendix 1).
Detailed information on allowed expenditures within the subsidy of maternal capital is aggregated
in two categories, which are housing and child’s education. Other variables include a number of
family members, mother’s age, etc. The survey also provides household-level data on the total
income of a household for 30 days, as well as on the total income of each household member.
I consider the total income of the whole household since I assume that the household members
make joint decisions on all types of expenditures with a shared budget constraint. All income
and expenditure values on education, housing services are normalized to 2007 rubles using the
Consumer Price Index (CPI).
The final sample consists of 2,714 unique mothers with one or two children and reported either
housing or education expenditures or both. I use this sample as a base to construct new datasets,
using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique, which is the method employed to balance the
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categories of families with two children. The summary statistics on individuals and households are
presented in Table 5 (Appendix 1). According to the data from Table 5, a mother having one child,
on average give birth at the age of 24, while the mothers with two children have their first child
at about 22. Almost 50 and 53 percent of first-born babies are boys among mothers with the only
child and mothers with two children respectively.
Tables 3 and 4 (Appendix 1) present the summary statistics on housing and children’s education
expenditures. The tables contain information on average expenditure levels of families with one or
two children for four consecutive years. Families with two children on average spend more both
on housing and education than one-child families. Overall, the expenditures on education show an
upward trend. In addition, housing expenditures of mothers with one child and mothers with two
children before 2007 tend to grow during the four-year period.
5 Methodology
In this study, I focus on mothers with one or two children. Since, in this case, the subsidy cannot be
redeemed for three years after the second child’s birth by eligible mothers, I investigate the effect
of the subsidy on housing and education spending behavior in expectation of maternal capital. I
use Difference-in-Difference method to estimate housing and education expenditures at the year of
second child’s birth and three consecutive years. The treatment group includes women who have 2
children, while the control group consists of women who have the only one child both before and
after the policy implementation.
Prior to the estimation of the Difference-in-Difference method, I revisited the composition of
the treatment group by applying PSM in order to fix the self-selection problem, which arises in
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non-experimental datasets. As a result of self-selection, individuals can choose to be a part of
a group eligible for “maternity capital” by altering childbearing decisions. Women may change
the timing of second and subsequent childbirth in response to the policy, or may even alter their
decision if they have only one child. I applied PSM method to balance the categories of families
having two children, such that self-selection problem will not result in a biased estimate in the final
model.
Initially proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the PSM allows the pseudo-randomization
of an observational dataset. This is achieved through direct modeling of a treatment assignment
process and forming subgroups of people with the same likelihood of participation in the treated or
control groups. PSM includes two main steps: estimation of the propensity score and the matching
process. The first step is an estimation of the propensity score, which calculates the conditional
probability of being treated given the vector of observed variables. The second step implies match-
ing treated individuals with untreated ones who have the closest value of propensity scores. In
other words, PSM matches treated and untreated individuals who have the most similar observed
characteristics (Caliendo 2008).
In order to estimate the propensity score, I include the following variables in the model: age
of a mother, the gender of the first child, the birth interval between the first and second child, the
logarithm of the total monthly income of a household before the birth of the second child and the
last reported mother’s education level prior to the birth of the second child. Propensity score allows
to combine given five variables in one index for each individual. Matching between individuals
based on one of these variables provides an opportunity to form a group of policy-affected (PA)
and not policy-affected (NPA) individuals with similar characteristics.
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The propensity score is estimated as follows:
Pr(Fi = 1|controls) = β0 + β1agei + β2malei + β3intervali +β4incomeit−1 + β4educationit−1
(1)
where F equals 1 if mother gave birth to the second child after 2007, and 0 otherwise, agei is the
age of ith mother at the birth of the second child, malei equals to 1 if ith mother’s first child is a
boy and 0 otherwise, intervali is the birth interval between the first and second child, incomeit is
the logarithm of the total monthly income of a household one year before the birth of the second
child, and educationit is mother’s education level before the birth of the second child. Families,
based on their current income level, may decide to have another child or adjust the planned date
of birth of the second one. Also, mothers may have a different level of knowledge on available
family support programs and subsidies depending on their education level. Hence, based on their
knowledge, they may alter the timing of birth or even change preferences in the number of children.
Once I obtain the propensity scores, I run the matching procedure. In the matching procedure,
I use the nearest neighbor matching with replacement with caliper method. The nearest neigh-
bor matching means that for each PA, NPA with the closest value of the propensity score will be
matched. The NPA individuals can be used more than once as a probable match for other PA indi-
viduals. Caliper represents the maximum permitted difference between the matched individuals.
I will test the following types of the caliper (0.01, 0.05, 025) and choose the one with the best
matching results. More detailed description of the PSM procedure and explanation on a number of
individuals matched is presented in Appendix 2.
Afterwards, I combine balanced datasets for the obtained treatment group using the PSM with
the individuals from the control group. Finally, I apply the Difference-in-Difference method in-
cluding the explanatory variables mentioned in Table 2. In addition, I apply the same estimation
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for the consequent three years on housing and education expenditures.
6 Results
I estimated the propensity score for the case of housing expenditures at the year of second child’s
birth using Equation (1). According to the estimation results in Table 1, propensity score was
calculated for 484 individuals. This amount is explained by the fact that only this number of
people reported information on all five variables and housing expenditures at the year of second
child’s birth. Almost all the included variables, except for dummies on mother’s education level,
are statistically significant.
Table 1: Correlates of the Propensity Score
(Housing expenditures, at the year of birth of the 2nd child)
Probit dydx
Age of mother 0.081*** 0.023***
(0.024) (0.007)
First child is a boy -0.185 -0.053
(0.132) (0.038)
Birth interval -0.088*** -0.025***
(0.025) (0.007)
Incomet−1 (in log) 0.448*** 0.129***
(0.062) (0.016)
Education level of mother (Ref: Unfinished secondary education)
Unfinished secondary education
and extra courses 1.051* 0.302
(0.571) (0.189)
Secondary school diploma 0.483 0.159
(0.537) (0.187)
Vocational secondary education diploma 0.579 0.187
(0.539) (0.188)
Higher education diploma and more 0.512 0.168
(0.546) (0.190)
Constant -5.877***
(0.960)
Observations 484 484
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Thus, I was able to match individuals using the nearest neighbor matching with replacement
with caliper method. I use caliper of 0.05 because it returns better results on variables used in the
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matching process compared to the one with a caliper of 0.25 and 0.01. The results of the matching
are presented in the first part of Table 6 (Appendix 1). It shows the results of the pre- and post-
matching t-tests for five variables used in the estimation process. The high value of p confirms an
hypothesis that the matched individuals do not differ. Results from Table 6 partially validate the
matching method since almost all variables show no significant differences between the groups of
PA and NPA.
As a result of a propensity score matching with replacement with a caliper, I obtained 700
matches, which is presented in Table 8 (Appendix 1). These matches form the treatment group in
the Difference-in-Difference method. The control group consists of 787 mothers with one child,
who was born in between 2000 and 2013 and reported their expenditures on housing at the year
of first child’s birth. I constructed eight balanced datasets for the treatment group using the PSM
procedure. First four datasets correspond to the housing expenditures for four consecutive time
periods starting from the birth of the second child. The remaining four datasets are constructed for
the educational expenditures at the second child birth’s year, and the three following years. Table 6
(Appendix 1) shows the results of the pre- and post-matching t-tests for five variables during three
consecutive years after the second child’s birth using housing expenditures as an outcome variable.
Next, Table 7 (Appendix 1) represents the matching results using spendings on education as an
outcome variable for the four investigated time periods. Table 9 (Appendix 1) shows information
on number of matches for the case of education expenditures. Observed expenditures on housing
of control group families in the birth year of the only child correspond to housing expenditures of
treatment group families at the birth year of the second child. The same applies for the following
years.
Finally, I proceed to the estimation of housing and education expenditures using Difference-
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in-Difference method. The results of Difference-in-Difference estimates on both expenditure cat-
egories are illustrated in Tables 10 and 11 (Appendix 1), also the same model including additional
features is shown in Tables 12 and 13 (Appendix 1).
Table 10 (Appendix 1) shows the estimation of the model, which includes only three main
variables: Policy, Policy × Treatment, and year dummies instead of the Policy. Without con-
trolling for household, individual and regional characteristics, it seems that families eligible for the
“maternity capital” reduce their housing expenditures in anticipation of getting a subsidy. There is
a significant decrease in the following three time periods by 40.5 in the year of the second child’s
birth, 28.6 and 26.4 percent after two and three years respectively. In contrast, the families with
two children in the absence of the subsidy spend significantly more on housing. These treatment
families consumed more than families having the only child: by 25.7 percent at the birth year, by
29.3 percent in two and 34.5 percent in three years after.
Table 12 (Appendix 1) presents an estimation of the model using the Difference-in-Difference
method with the extra explanatory variables, which control for household, individual and regional
characteristics. Even though signs of Policy × Treatment and Treatment variables are the
same, the addition of control variables results in the loss of significance for several time periods.
Families eligible for the subsidy decrease their housing spending throughout the four-year period.
A significant decrease by 18.4 percentage points takes place at the year of the second child’s birth.
In addition, a significant fall by 34.9 percent in housing spending appears three years after the
second child’s birth.
There is a possible interpretations of such a response. I assume that eligible for the subsidy
families decrease their housing expenditures, including rental costs. The legislation amendments
may be the reason for changes in consumption behavior of treated families. Overall, between
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2006 and 2015 there were nineteen amendments and supplements made to the “Federal Law on
Supplementary governmental measures to support families having children” of 29.12.2006 which
regulates the “maternity capital” subsidy. Table 14 (Appendix 1) provides information on five main
amendments related to housing expenditures. In particular, starting from 2009 the government
reduced the subsidy-waiting period for eligible families having the mortgage prior the birth, to use
the subsidy without three-year waiting. Initially, this amendment was expected to operate until the
end of 2010 but with the deadline abolishment, families can still use the subsidy without three-year
expectation to cover the mortgage. Since some eligible families would buy an apartment or invest
in construction of housing, spendings for their housing expenditures on average would decrease.
It is likely that eligible families having the mortgage would decrease their housing expenditures
immediately right after the second child’s birth. Families without a mortgage would spend less on
housing only three years after.
Next, I consider the effect of subsidies on education expenses of treated families in Russia.
According to the the “Federal Law on Supplementary governmental measures to support families
having children” of 29.12.2006, the “maternity capital” is supposed to cover any educational ex-
penses of children. Table 15 (Appendix 1) shows the main changes made between 2000-2015 in
education spending regulations in comparison to the original maternal capital law. The amend-
ments changed only the type of the educational organization, whose services can be covered by
the subsidy. Thus, the parents are still able to cover any educational costs of a child not older than
25. However, I focus on educational expenditures represented by the costs on education of only
pre-school and school-aged children.
Table 11 (Appendix 1) shows the estimation results on changes in education expenditures using
Difference-in-Difference method, which includes only Treatment, Policy×Treatment, and year
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dummy variables. Table 13 (Appendix 1) shows the estimates using the Difference-in-Difference
method with additional explanatory variables controlling for household, individual and regional
characteristics. According to Table 11 (Appendix 1), in absence of the policy, families with two
children spend more on education than families with one child. Also, it is a significant increase of
eligible families’ expenditures on education by 98.5 percent at the year of the second child’s birth,
and by 48.9 percent a year after.
Results in Table 13 (Appendix 1) show that after the addition of extra controls, families with
two children demonstrate higher spending level on education compared to families with the only
child. Eligible families significantly increase their expenditures by 63 percent at the year of the
second child’s birth and by 41.9 percent two years later. Probably eligible families knowing that
after the three years they will receive money for “maternity capital” certificate, parents possess
freed funds and start spending on education of their children more. Another possible explanation
is that increase in education expenditures takes place because parents may send their first child to
preschool or additional courses, because they are more busy after the second child’s birth. The
positive trend in expenditures on education is being maintained for the investigated four-year pe-
riod.
7 Conclusion
The paper analyzed the effect of the “maternity capital” implemented in 2007 on consumption
behavior of eligible families in three-year expectation of the subsidy in Russia. Particularly, the
main focus of the paper is the changes in housing and children’s education expenditures.
As a result, I found that eligible families decrease their expenditures on housing starting from
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the year of second child’s birth using the Difference-in-Difference method. To be precise, there is
a significant decrease of housing expenditures at the year of second child’s birth by 18.4 percent
and by approximately 35 percent three years after. In addition, I suggested that the decrease in
housing expenditures is probably connected to the introduction of new amendments in the current
legislation. I also proposed that another possible reason is the improvement of family’s living
conditions which reduced spending on rent, municipal services and etc.
In contrast, the estimates of subsidy on education expenditures show that eligible families in-
crease spending on education by 63 percent at the year of the second child’s birth and by 41.9
percent two years later. I assume that education expenditures of eligible families increased be-
cause of the relocation of available resources. Families that expect to get 10,000 USD after three
years, may decrease housing spending and invest the freed funds in the education of their children.
Overall, the suggested explanations of obtained results on both types of expenditures validate each
other.
In general, these results can be implemented in further investigation of this topic and further
developments in family-based policies. This research currently covers periods from 2000 to 2016,
and it is suggested to increase the scope of the study by expanding the data for longer time periods
with new RLMS data available.
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Appendix 1
Table 2: Description of the variables
Variable Description
Housing expenditures (in log)
Housing expenditures:
- purchase of building materials,
- maintenance and repair of a dwelling,
or moving house,
- payments for municipal services and rent, etc.
Education expenditures (in log)
Education expenditures:
- clubs, courses, and lessons for children,
- childcare costs,
- learning materials, etc.
Income The total monthly income of a household (in log)
Number of family members Number of people living in a householdsharing both income and expenditures
Mother’s age Age of mother
Mother’s education level
Educational level of the mother:
- Unfinished secondary education,
- Unfinished secondary education and extra courses,
- Secondary school education,
- Vocational secondary education,
- Higher education and more
Urban
Type of area:
- Urban (=1),
- Rural (=0)
Marital status
Marital status:
- Never married,
- In a registered marriage,
- Living together, not registered,
- Divorced and not remarried,
- Widower or widow,
- Registered, not living together
Property owners
Type of ownership of dwelling:
- Own (=1),
- Rent (=0)
Current working status
Current working status:
- Working,
- On leave,
- Not working
Continued on next page
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Variable Description
Living space Total area of living space (in square meters)
Region
- Moscow and St. Petersburg,
- Northern and North Western,
- Central and Central Black-Earth,
- Volga-Vaytski and Volga Basin,
- North Caucasian,
- Ural,
- Western Siberian,
- Eastern Siberian and Far East
Policy Dummy variable, which equals one for periodafter 2007
Treatment Dummy variable, which equals one for Treatmentand is zero for Control group
Table 3: Average housing expenditures (in 2007 rubles prices)
Woman with one child Woman with two children
Before 2007 After 2007 Before 2007 After 2007
Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Instantaneous 283 1848.922 504 3311.527 350 1822.415 350 2814.387
(2268.640) (3271.767) (1148.662) (2810.104)
A year after 260 1933.731 620 3259.649 324 2132.922 324 3121.148
(2151.365) (2945.355) (1531.373) (3133.871)
Two years after 227 1924.542 667 3234.526 300 3285.474 300 3371.974
(2432.873) (3237.671) (5087.428) (3762.856)
Three years after 189 2188.795 687 2985.495 289 3407.214 289 3082.915
(2656.134) (2759.798) (3600.893) (3007.491)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
Table 4: Average education expenditures (in 2007 rubles prices)
Woman having one child Woman having two children
Before 2007 After 2007 Before 2007 After 2007
Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Instantaneous 95 336.992 212 447.2661 319 1096.426 319 1012.987
(656.404) (1051.322) (1260.648) (1015.849)
A year after 142 722.671 296 887.015 309 1124.488 309 1085.456
(1136.164) (2033.015) (916.638) (1167.709)
Two years after 237 1295.017 609 1484.589 295 1598.130 295 1624.864
(1941.017) (1841.492) (1638.925) (1645.076)
Three years after 258 1337 831 1646.827 279 2076.580 279 2015.070
(1425.439) (1980.139) (1333.664) (1837.128)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
28
Ta
bl
e
5:
D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e
st
at
is
tic
s
on
in
di
vi
du
al
an
d
ho
us
eh
ol
d
va
ri
ab
le
s
W
om
an
w
ith
on
e
ch
ild
W
om
an
w
ith
tw
o
ch
ild
re
n
B
ef
or
e
20
07
A
ft
er
20
07
B
ef
or
e
20
07
A
ft
er
20
07
M
ea
n
M
ea
n
M
ea
n
M
ea
n
A
ge
of
m
ot
he
r
A
tt
he
fir
st
bi
rt
h
23
.9
06
24
.9
13
21
.4
60
22
.8
01
(4
.4
46
)
(4
.3
39
)
(3
.1
56
)
(3
.5
72
)
A
tt
he
se
co
nd
bi
rt
h
.
.
28
.3
43
29
.3
54
.
.
(4
.1
59
)
(4
.4
78
)
Fi
rs
tc
hi
ld
is
a
bo
y
0.
51
3
0.
51
7
0.
55
0
0.
53
8
(0
.4
99
)
(0
.4
99
)
(0
.4
97
)
(0
.4
99
)
N
um
.o
ff
am
.m
em
be
rs
3.
80
3
3.
94
6
4.
27
5
4.
34
4
(1
.4
40
)
(1
.5
26
)
(1
.1
46
)
(1
.3
42
)
E
du
ca
tio
n
le
ve
l
U
nfi
ni
sh
ed
se
co
nd
ar
y
0.
01
5
0.
00
7
0.
02
5
0.
00
5
(0
.1
22
)
(0
.0
87
)
(0
.1
56
)
(0
.0
74
)
U
nfi
ni
sh
ed
se
co
nd
ar
y
an
d
ex
tr
a
co
ur
se
s
0.
08
0
0.
08
8
0.
07
8
0.
10
5
(0
.2
72
)
(0
.2
83
)
(0
.2
69
)
(0
.3
07
)
Se
co
nd
ar
y
sc
ho
ol
0.
33
9
0.
23
5
0.
35
1
0.
28
0
(0
.4
73
)
(0
.4
24
)
(0
.4
77
)
(0
.4
49
)
Vo
ca
tio
na
ls
ec
on
da
ry
0.
30
5
0.
26
7
0.
29
6
0.
25
6
(0
.4
60
)
(0
.4
42
)
(0
.4
56
)
(0
.4
36
)
H
ig
he
ra
nd
m
or
e
0.
25
9
0.
40
1
0.
24
8
0.
35
2
(0
.4
38
)
(0
.4
90
)
(0
.4
32
)
(0
.4
77
)
U
rb
an
0.
76
8
0.
75
7
0.
65
5
0.
64
7
(0
.4
20
)
(0
.4
28
)
(0
.4
75
)
(0
.4
77
)
Pr
op
er
ty
ow
ne
rs
0.
79
5
0.
82
4
0.
82
1
0.
86
8
(0
.4
03
)
(0
.3
80
)
(0
.3
82
)
(0
.3
37
)
L
iv
in
g
sp
ac
e
49
.5
15
53
.9
16
54
.1
40
58
.3
59
(2
1.
23
0)
(2
3.
96
5)
(2
2.
71
2)
(2
4.
99
8)
In
co
m
e
(i
n
20
07
ru
b.
p.
)
18
03
7.
94
0
27
65
3.
87
0
17
27
7.
09
0
24
86
9.
46
0
(1
41
94
.9
70
)
(1
78
47
.5
10
)
(1
59
13
.2
10
)
(1
66
90
.7
60
)
N
um
be
ro
f
m
ot
he
rs
/h
ou
se
ho
ld
s
57
0
98
5
33
9
82
0
N
ot
e:
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
29
Table 6: Pre- and post-matching t-tests
(Housing expenditures)
Unmatched sample Matched sample
PA NPA p PA NA p
Housing expenditures, at the year of birth of the 2nd child
Age of mother 29.480 28.754 0.101 29.480 29.303 0.564
First child is a boy 0.525 0.574 0.335 0.525 0.431 0.012*
Birth interval 6.837 7.380 0.176 6.837 6.580 0.382
Income (in log) 9.897 8.933 0.000* 9.897 9.821 0.265
Education level
Unfinished secondary education 0.008 0.029 0.080 0.008 0.002 0.317
Unfinished secondary education and extra courses 0.100 0.074 0.391 0.100 0.082 0.432
Secondary school diploma 0.274 0.380 0.023* 0.274 0.220 0.096
Vocational secondary education diploma 0.294 0.291 0.944 0.294 0.345 0.145
Higher education diploma and more 0.322 0.223 0.033* 0.322 0.348 0.472
Housing expenditures, one year after the birth of the 2nd child
Age of mother 29.835 28.845 0.034* 29.744 30.435 0.044*
First child is a boy 0.530 0.573 0.406 0.527 0.450 0.050
Birth interval 6.966 7.511 0.209 7.012 7.410 0.203
Income (in log) 9.879 9.025 0.000* 9.870 9.633 0.004*
Education level
Unfinished secondary education 0.015 0.023 0.558 0.015 0.009 0.478
Unfinished secondary education and extra courses 0.088 0.062 0.353 0.086 0.089 0.890
Secondary school diploma 0.265 0.418 0.001* 0.268 0.206 0.065
Vocational secondary education diploma 0.268 0.271 0.948 0.271 0.293 0.542
Higher education diploma and more 0.362 0.224 0.004* 0.358 0.401 0.258
Housing expenditures, two years after the birth of the 2nd child
Age of mother 29.703 28.741 0.035* 29.583 30.367 0.019*
First child is a boy 0.547 0.525 0.675 0.543 0.486 0.165
Birth interval 7.028 7.296 0.517 7.056 7.473 0.183
Income (in log) 9.872 9.024 0.000* 9.865 9.679 0.010*
Education level
Unfinished secondary education 0.009 0.022 0.281 0.010 0.003 0.316
Unfinished secondary education and extra courses 0.104 0.051 0.072 0.076 0.116 0.098
Secondary school diploma 0.268 0.385 0.014* 0.280 0.216 0.073
Vocational secondary education diploma 0.287 0.296 0.859 0.300 0.253 0.202
Higher education diploma and more 0.329 0.410 0.074 0.333 0.410 0.052
Housing expenditures, three years after the birth of the 2nd child
Age of mother 29.620 28.767 0.058 29.561 29.768 0.538
First child is a boy 0.551 0.601 0.335 0.550 0.494 0.183
Birth interval 6.900 7.526 0.131 6.941 7.321 0.254
Income (in log) 9.844 9.067 0.000* 9.837 9.809 0.735
Education level
Unfinished secondary education 0.003 0.007 0.568 0.003 0.000 0.318
Unfinished secondary education and extra courses 0.109 0.067 0.175 0.103 0.103 1.000
Secondary school diploma 0.263 0.375 0.019* 0.266 0.242 0.505
Vocational secondary education diploma 0.294 0.330 0.453 0.297 0.283 0.715
Higher education diploma and more 0.328 0.218 0.020* 0.328 0.370 0.296
p∗<0.05
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Table 7: Pre- and post-matching t-tests
(Education expenditures)
Unmatched sample Matched sample
PA NPA p PA NPA p
Education expenditures, at the year of birth of the 2nd child
Age of mother 29.796 29.107 0.128 29.796 30.119 0.308
First child is a boy 0.517 0.565 0.364 0.517 0.448 0.082
Birth interval 7.326 7.737 0.310 7.326 7.620 0.321
Income (in log) 9.880 9.014 0.000* 9.880 9.835 0.539
Education level
Unfinished secondary education 0.012 0.032 0.155 0.012 0.015 0.738
Unfinished secondary education and extra courses 0.100 0.065 0.257 0.100 0.059 0.058
Secondary school diploma 0.253 0.393 0.004* 0.253 0.188 0.045*
Vocational secondary education diploma 0.288 0.270 0.710 0.288 0.322 0.345
Higher education diploma and more 0.344 0.413 0.030* 0.344 0.413 0.073
Education expenditures, one year after the birth of the 2nd child
Age of mother 29.634 29.112 0.261 29.634 30.013 0.255
First child is a boy 0.511 0.551 0.459 0.511 0.346 0.000*
Birth interval 6.961 7.655 0.094 6.961 7.647 0.018*
Income (in log) 9.836 9.039 0.000* 9.836 9.616 0.014*
Education level
Unfinished secondary education 0.009 0.043 0.024* 0.009 0.000 0.083
Unfinished secondary education and extra courses 0.110 0.060 0.123 0.110 0.129 0.458
Secondary school diploma 0.262 0.379 0.018* 0.262 0.213 0.157
Vocational secondary education diploma 0.268 0.293 0.616 0.268 0.226 0.226
Higher education diploma and more 0.349 0.224 0.013* 0.349 0.430 0.039*
Education expenditures, two years after the birth of the 2nd child
Age of mother 29.584 29.197 0.397 29.576 29.583 0.983
First child is a boy 0.523 0.565 0.436 0.522 0.386 0.001*
Birth interval 7.027 7.598 0.162 7.040 6.864 0.534
Income (in log) 9.814 8.931 0.000* 9.809 9.579 0.012*
Education level
Unfinished secondary education 0.006 0.024 0.128 0.006 0.000 0.157
Unfinished secondary education and extra courses 0.118 0.057 0.060 0.115 0.128 0.616
Secondary school diploma 0.253 0.393 0.004* 0.254 0.162 0.006*
Vocational secondary education diploma 0.280 0.295 0.763 0.281 0.349 0.077
Higher education diploma and more 0.341 0.229 0.025* 0.342 0.359 0.667
Education expenditures, three years after the birth of the 2nd child
Age of mother 29.806 29.483 0.496 29.806 30.032 0.506
First child is a boy 0.523 0.620 0.077 0.523 0.437 0.042*
Birth interval 7.132 8.000 0.046* 7.132 7.039 0.778
Income (in log) 9.832 9.009 0.000* 9.832 9.767 0.414
Education level
Unfinished secondary education 0.007 0.034 0.043* 0.007 0.000 0.157
Unfinished secondary education and extra courses 0.118 0.060 0.083 0.118 0.064 0.028*
Secondary school diploma 0.243 0.370 0.010* 0.243 0.304 0.107
Vocational secondary education diploma 0.301 0.310 0.856 0.301 0.232 0.069
Higher education diploma and more 0.329 0.224 0.037* 0.329 0.397 0.095
p∗<0.05
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Table 8: Sample size in original and matched samples (Housing expenditures)
Sample Type Sample Size Number of PA Number of NPA
Period: at the year of birth of the 2nd child
Non-matched sample 484 350 134
Matched sample 700 350 350
Period: one year after the birth of the 2nd child
Non-matched sample 457 328 129
Matched sample 648 324 324
Period: two years after the birth of the 2nd child
Non-matched sample 451 316 135
Matched sample 600 300 300
Period: three years after the birth of the 2nd child
Non-matched sample 425 292 133
Matched sample 578 289 289
Table 9: Sample size in original and matched samples (Education expenditures)
Sample Type Sample Size Number of PA Number of NPA
Category: expenditures on education
Period: at the year of birth of the 2nd child
Non-matched sample 441 319 122
Matched sample 638 319 319
Period: one year after the birth of the 2nd child
Non-matched sample 425 309 116
Matched sample 618 309 309
Period: two years after the birth of the 2nd child
Non-matched sample 418 296 122
Matched sample 590 295 295
Period: three years after the birth of the 2nd child
Non-matched sample 395 279 116
Matched sample 558 279 279
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Table 10: Regression results of subsidies on housing expenditures (in log) using Diff-in-Diff
method
Instantaneous A year after Two years after Three years after
Treatment 0.257*** 0.096 0.293** 0.345***
(0.089) (0.084) (0.115) (0.127)
Policy×Treatment -0.405*** -0.159 -0.286** -0.264*
(0.115) (0.102) (0.132) (0.147)
Constant 6.449*** 6.623*** 6.623*** 6.875***
(0.147) (0.130) (0.172) (0.140)
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,117 1,435 1,165 854
R-squared 0.149 0.137 0.083 0.085
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11: Regression results of subsidies on education expenditures (in log) using Diff-in-Diff
method
Instantaneous A year after Two years after Three years after
Treatment 1.201*** 1.026*** 0.300* 0.318*
(0.237) (0.195) (0.176) (0.184)
Policy×Treatment 0.985*** 0.489** 0.130 0.007
(0.297) (0.242) (0.209) (0.211)
Constant 5.849*** 4.658*** 6.394*** 6.714***
(0.423) (0.377) (0.252) (0.188)
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 838 1,049 1,191 1,101
R-squared 0.276 0.210 0.063 0.064
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
33
Ta
bl
e
12
:R
eg
re
ss
io
n
re
su
lts
of
su
bs
id
ie
s
on
ho
us
in
g
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
(i
n
lo
g)
us
in
g
D
iff
-i
n-
D
iff
m
et
ho
d
In
st
an
ta
ne
ou
s
A
ye
ar
af
te
r
Tw
o
ye
ar
s
af
te
r
T
hr
ee
ye
ar
s
af
te
r
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
0.
00
0
0.
01
4
0.
18
9
0.
30
2*
*
(0
.0
87
)
(0
.0
87
)
(0
.1
21
)
(0
.1
28
)
Po
lic
y×
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
-0
.1
84
*
-0
.0
71
-0
.1
50
-0
.3
49
**
*
(0
.0
99
)
(0
.0
94
)
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.1
33
)
C
ur
re
nt
w
or
ki
ng
st
at
us
(R
ef
:
W
or
ki
ng
)
O
n
le
av
e
0.
11
3
-0
.0
23
0.
01
0
-0
.2
71
**
(0
.0
89
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
62
)
(0
.1
33
)
N
ot
w
or
ki
ng
0.
07
3
-0
.0
15
0.
02
1
-0
.0
95
(0
.0
99
)
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
62
)
M
ar
ita
ls
ta
tu
s
of
m
ot
he
r
(R
ef
:
N
ev
er
m
ar
ri
ed
)
In
a
re
gi
st
er
ed
m
ar
ri
ag
e
0.
06
8
0.
04
6
0.
07
0
0.
15
1
(0
.0
96
)
(0
.0
82
)
(0
.0
97
)
(0
.0
96
)
L
iv
in
g
to
ge
th
er
,n
ot
re
gi
st
er
ed
-0
.1
29
-0
.1
68
*
0.
08
3
-0
.0
83
(0
.1
12
)
(0
.0
95
)
(0
.1
16
)
(0
.1
17
)
D
iv
or
ce
d
an
d
no
tr
em
ar
ri
ed
-0
.1
52
0.
37
0*
*
0.
27
1*
-0
.0
12
(0
.2
51
)
(0
.1
51
)
(0
.1
59
)
(0
.1
28
)
W
id
ow
er
or
w
id
ow
-0
.3
81
-0
.2
77
-0
.7
47
*
-0
.0
41
(0
.3
43
)
(0
.3
80
)
(0
.4
23
)
(0
.4
39
)
R
eg
is
te
re
d,
no
tl
iv
in
g
to
ge
th
er
-0
.0
02
-0
.1
16
0.
26
6
-0
.1
96
(0
.2
53
)
(0
.1
84
)
(0
.2
39
)
(0
.3
61
)
E
du
ca
tio
n
le
ve
lo
fm
ot
he
r
(R
ef
:
U
nfi
ni
sh
ed
se
co
nd
ar
y
ed
uc
at
io
n)
U
nfi
ni
sh
ed
se
co
nd
ar
y
ed
uc
at
io
n
an
d
ex
tr
a
co
ur
se
s
-0
.0
52
-0
.3
90
*
-0
.8
22
**
-0
.4
47
(0
.2
93
)
(0
.2
16
)
(0
.3
54
)
(0
.4
12
)
Se
co
nd
ar
y
sc
ho
ol
di
pl
om
a
-0
.0
16
-0
.2
70
-0
.8
90
**
-0
.5
92
(0
.2
90
)
(0
.2
11
)
(0
.3
47
)
(0
.4
01
)
Vo
ca
tio
na
ls
ec
on
da
ry
ed
uc
at
io
n
di
pl
om
a
0.
10
6
-0
.2
37
-0
.7
09
**
-0
.6
37
(0
.2
90
)
(0
.2
10
)
(0
.3
46
)
(0
.4
04
)
H
ig
he
re
du
ca
tio
n
di
pl
om
a
an
d
m
or
e
0.
04
3
-0
.1
28
-0
.6
39
*
-0
.3
81
(0
.2
91
)
(0
.2
11
)
(0
.3
46
)
(0
.4
00
)
In
co
m
e t
−1
(i
n
lo
g)
0.
06
4*
*
0.
12
5*
**
0.
16
3*
**
0.
04
8
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
35
)
N
um
be
ro
ff
am
ily
m
em
be
rs
0.
12
7*
**
0.
08
1*
**
0.
03
9*
0.
17
0*
**
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
25
)
U
rb
an
-0
.2
46
-0
.2
55
0.
52
5*
**
-0
.4
07
(0
.3
83
)
(0
.3
45
)
(0
.1
17
)
(0
.4
97
)
Pr
op
er
ty
ow
ne
rs
-0
.2
63
**
*
-0
.3
00
**
*
-0
.3
08
**
*
-0
.4
28
**
*
(0
.0
74
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
82
)
(0
.0
84
)
A
ge
of
m
ot
he
r
0.
00
6
-0
.0
02
0.
00
4
-0
.0
02
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
06
)
L
iv
in
g
ar
ea
(i
n
sq
ua
re
m
et
er
s)
0.
00
3*
**
0.
00
1
0.
00
6*
**
0.
00
6*
**
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
C
on
st
an
t
5.
56
9*
**
6.
13
3*
**
5.
64
6*
**
6.
47
4*
**
(0
.4
81
)
(0
.4
65
)
(0
.5
82
)
(0
.7
14
)
Ti
m
e
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
eg
io
na
ld
um
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
1,
11
7
1,
43
5
1,
16
5
85
4
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
56
5
0.
47
5
0.
34
7
0.
53
8
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1
34
Ta
bl
e
13
:R
eg
re
ss
io
n
re
su
lts
of
su
bs
id
ie
s
on
ed
uc
at
io
n
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
(i
n
lo
g)
us
in
g
D
iff
-i
n-
D
iff
m
et
ho
d
In
st
an
ta
ne
ou
s
A
ye
ar
af
te
r
Tw
o
ye
ar
s
af
te
r
T
hr
ee
ye
ar
s
af
te
r
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
1.
81
8*
**
1.
32
5*
**
0.
21
7
0.
32
7*
(0
.2
78
)
(0
.2
39
)
(0
.1
90
)
(0
.1
94
)
Po
lic
y×
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
0.
63
0*
*
0.
40
7
0.
41
9*
*
0.
01
2
(0
.3
05
)
(0
.2
61
)
(0
.2
03
)
(0
.2
04
)
C
ur
re
nt
w
or
ki
ng
st
at
us
(R
ef
:
W
or
ki
ng
)
O
n
le
av
e
-0
.0
01
-0
.6
28
**
*
-0
.1
21
-0
.5
36
**
*
(0
.2
15
)
(0
.1
59
)
(0
.1
09
)
(0
.1
98
)
N
ot
w
or
ki
ng
-0
.0
24
-1
.0
07
**
*
-0
.6
05
**
*
-0
.4
81
**
*
(0
.2
43
)
(0
.1
85
)
(0
.1
15
)
(0
.1
05
)
M
ar
ita
ls
ta
tu
s
of
m
ot
he
r
(R
ef
:
N
ev
er
m
ar
ri
ed
)
In
a
re
gi
st
er
ed
m
ar
ri
ag
e
-0
.0
55
0.
08
6
-0
.0
68
0.
45
3*
**
(0
.3
23
)
(0
.2
51
)
(0
.1
72
)
(0
.1
55
)
L
iv
in
g
to
ge
th
er
,n
ot
re
gi
st
er
ed
-0
.2
68
0.
58
6*
*
0.
15
2
0.
48
1*
**
(0
.3
51
)
(0
.2
94
)
(0
.2
07
)
(0
.1
86
)
D
iv
or
ce
d
an
d
no
tr
em
ar
ri
ed
-0
.0
95
-0
.2
05
0.
25
1
0.
26
0
(0
.6
47
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.2
79
)
(0
.2
06
)
W
id
ow
er
or
w
id
ow
-3
.0
42
**
*
-1
.0
04
-0
.7
36
1.
14
3
(0
.9
91
)
(1
.2
87
)
(1
.0
80
)
(0
.9
39
)
R
eg
is
te
re
d,
no
tl
iv
in
g
to
ge
th
er
-0
.4
94
-0
.3
95
0.
39
5
0.
55
9
(0
.5
86
)
(0
.6
77
)
(0
.4
43
)
(0
.6
72
)
E
du
ca
tio
n
le
ve
lo
fm
ot
he
r
(R
ef
:
U
nfi
ni
sh
ed
se
co
nd
ar
y
ed
uc
at
io
n)
U
nfi
ni
sh
ed
se
co
nd
ar
y
ed
uc
at
io
n
an
d
ex
tr
a
co
ur
se
s
1.
58
9*
*
2.
19
5*
*
0.
20
7
-0
.3
91
(0
.6
68
)
(1
.0
32
)
(0
.7
00
)
(0
.6
70
)
Se
co
nd
ar
y
sc
ho
ol
di
pl
om
a
1.
66
4*
*
2.
17
2*
*
0.
09
9
-0
.7
36
(0
.6
78
)
(1
.0
32
)
(0
.6
92
)
(0
.6
59
)
Vo
ca
tio
na
ls
ec
on
da
ry
ed
uc
at
io
n
di
pl
om
a
1.
43
0*
*
2.
60
0*
*
0.
17
5
-0
.5
74
(0
.6
73
)
(1
.0
48
)
(0
.6
90
)
(0
.6
60
)
H
ig
he
re
du
ca
tio
n
di
pl
om
a
an
d
m
or
e
1.
91
2*
**
2.
67
7*
*
0.
32
9
-0
.3
17
(0
.6
73
)
(1
.0
49
)
(0
.6
90
)
(0
.6
60
)
In
co
m
e t
−1
(i
n
lo
g)
-0
.1
71
*
0.
00
4
0.
38
1*
**
0.
09
3*
(0
.0
93
)
(0
.0
75
)
(0
.0
55
)
N
um
be
ro
ff
am
ily
m
em
be
rs
0.
27
9*
**
0.
09
4*
-0
.1
51
**
*
-0
.0
34
(0
.0
52
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
39
)
U
rb
an
-0
.1
12
1.
85
3*
*
0.
09
2
0.
20
7*
*
(0
.8
09
)
(0
.9
43
)
(0
.1
06
)
(0
.0
97
)
A
ge
of
m
ot
he
r
-0
.0
35
**
-0
.0
28
*
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
14
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
10
)
C
on
st
an
t
4.
41
0*
**
1.
86
8
3.
55
7*
**
6.
39
0*
**
(1
.3
40
)
(1
.5
13
)
(1
.0
58
)
(0
.9
35
)
Ti
m
e
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
eg
io
na
ld
um
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
83
8
1,
04
9
1,
19
1
1,
10
1
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
51
1
0.
38
1
0.
17
3
0.
17
9
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1
35
Ta
bl
e
14
:A
m
en
dm
en
ts
in
th
e
L
aw
ab
ou
th
ou
si
ng
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
T
he
Fe
de
ra
lL
aw
N
25
6-
FZ
of
29
.1
2.
20
06
on
Su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ry
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l
m
ea
su
re
st
o
su
pp
or
tf
am
ili
es
ha
vi
ng
ch
ild
re
n
T
he
Fe
de
ra
lL
aw
N
28
8-
FZ
of
25
.1
2.
20
08
on
Su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ry
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l
m
ea
su
re
st
o
su
pp
or
tf
am
ili
es
ha
vi
ng
ch
ild
re
n
T
he
Fe
de
ra
lL
aw
N
24
1-
FZ
of
28
.0
7.
20
10
on
Su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ry
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l
m
ea
su
re
st
o
su
pp
or
tf
am
ili
es
ha
vi
ng
ch
ild
re
n
T
he
Fe
de
ra
lL
aw
N
44
0-
FZ
of
29
.1
2.
20
10
on
Su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ry
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l
m
ea
su
re
st
o
su
pp
or
tf
am
ili
es
ha
vi
ng
ch
ild
re
n
T
he
Fe
de
ra
lL
aw
N
13
1-
FZ
of
23
.0
5.
20
15
on
Su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ry
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l
m
ea
su
re
st
o
su
pp
or
tf
am
ili
es
ha
vi
ng
ch
ild
re
n
C
ha
lle
ng
in
g
“m
at
er
ni
ty
ca
pi
ta
l”
su
bs
id
y
to
(i
m
pr
ov
e
liv
in
g
co
nd
iti
on
s)
:
Pu
rc
ha
se
or
co
ns
tr
uc
ta
ho
us
in
g
af
te
rt
he
th
re
e
ye
ar
s
of
bi
rt
h
of
th
e
se
co
nd
,t
hi
rd
or
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
ch
ild
re
n.
T
he
sa
m
e
T
he
sa
m
e
T
he
sa
m
e
Pa
y
pr
in
ci
pa
la
nd
in
te
re
st
on
cr
ed
it
or
lo
an
s
ob
ta
in
ed
fo
r
pu
rp
os
es
of
ac
qu
ir
in
g
or
bu
ild
in
g
a
dw
el
lin
g,
in
cl
ud
in
g
m
or
tg
ag
e
lo
an
s,
af
te
rt
he
th
re
e
ye
ar
s
of
bi
rt
h
of
th
e
se
co
nd
,
th
ir
d
or
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
ch
ild
re
n.
Pa
y
pr
in
ci
pa
la
nd
in
te
re
st
on
cr
ed
it
or
lo
an
s
ob
ta
in
ed
fo
r
pu
rp
os
es
of
ac
qu
ir
in
g
or
bu
ild
in
g
a
dw
el
lin
g,
in
cl
ud
in
g
m
or
tg
ag
e
lo
an
s,
w
ith
ou
tw
ai
tin
g
fo
rt
hr
ee
ye
ar
s
af
te
r
th
e
ye
ar
of
bi
rt
h
of
th
e
se
co
nd
,
th
ir
d
or
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
ch
ild
re
n.
E
xp
ir
at
io
n
da
te
is
31
.1
2.
20
10
.
T
he
sa
m
e
Pa
y
pr
in
ci
pa
la
nd
in
te
re
st
on
cr
ed
it
or
lo
an
s
ob
ta
in
ed
fo
r
pu
rp
os
es
of
ac
qu
ir
in
g
or
bu
ild
in
g
a
dw
el
lin
g,
in
cl
ud
in
g
m
or
tg
ag
e
lo
an
s,
w
ith
ou
tw
ai
tin
g
fo
rt
hr
ee
ye
ar
s
af
te
r
th
e
ye
ar
of
bi
rt
h
of
th
e
se
co
nd
,
th
ir
d
or
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
ch
ild
re
n.
Pa
y
an
in
iti
al
co
nt
ri
bu
tio
n
an
d/
or
pa
y
pr
in
ci
pa
la
nd
in
te
re
st
on
cr
ed
it
or
lo
an
s
ob
ta
in
ed
fo
rp
ur
po
se
s
of
ac
qu
ir
in
g
or
bu
ild
in
g
a
dw
el
lin
g,
in
cl
ud
in
g
m
or
tg
ag
e
lo
an
s)
,w
ith
ou
tw
ai
tin
g
fo
rt
hr
ee
ye
ar
s
af
te
r
th
e
ye
ar
of
bi
rt
h
of
th
e
se
co
nd
,
th
ir
d
or
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
ch
ild
re
n.
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
or
re
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n
of
ac
co
m
m
od
at
io
n
th
at
is
m
ad
e
by
th
e
ci
tiz
en
s
of
th
e
R
us
si
an
Fe
de
ra
tio
n
w
ith
ou
tt
he
in
vo
lv
em
en
to
fo
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
th
at
pr
ov
id
e
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n
an
d
re
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n
se
rv
ic
es
.
T
he
sa
m
e
T
he
sa
m
e
N
ot
e:
Pu
rc
ha
se
d
ac
co
m
m
od
at
io
n
m
us
tb
e
al
lo
ca
te
d
in
th
e
R
us
si
an
Fe
de
ra
tio
n.
“M
at
er
ni
ty
ca
pi
ta
l”
su
bs
id
y
is
gr
an
te
d
on
ly
fo
rc
iti
ze
ns
of
th
e
R
us
si
an
Fe
de
ra
tio
n.
36
Ta
bl
e
15
:A
m
en
dm
en
ts
in
th
e
L
aw
ab
ou
te
du
ca
tio
n
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
T
he
Fe
de
ra
lL
aw
N
25
6-
FZ
of
29
.1
2.
20
06
on
Su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ry
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
lm
ea
su
re
st
o
su
pp
or
t
fa
m
ili
es
ha
vi
ng
ch
ild
re
n
T
he
Fe
de
ra
lL
aw
N
31
8-
FZ
of
16
.1
1.
20
11
on
Su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ry
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
lm
ea
su
re
st
o
su
pp
or
t
fa
m
ili
es
ha
vi
ng
ch
ild
re
n
T
he
Fe
de
ra
lL
aw
N
18
5-
FZ
of
02
.0
7.
20
13
on
Su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ry
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
lm
ea
su
re
st
o
su
pp
or
t
fa
m
ili
es
ha
vi
ng
ch
ild
re
n
T
he
Fe
de
ra
lL
aw
N
68
4-
FZ
of
14
.0
7.
20
14
on
Su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ry
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
lm
ea
su
re
st
o
su
pp
or
t
fa
m
ili
es
ha
vi
ng
ch
ild
re
n
C
ha
lle
ng
in
g
“m
at
er
ni
ty
ca
pi
ta
l”
su
bs
id
y
to
(c
ov
er
ed
uc
at
io
na
lc
os
ts
of
ch
ild
re
n)
:
C
ov
er
ed
uc
at
io
n
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
of
th
e
ch
ild
or
ch
ild
re
n
at
an
y
ed
uc
at
io
na
l
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
tw
ith
in
th
e
R
us
si
an
Fe
de
ra
tio
n.
A
ls
o,
ed
uc
at
io
na
l
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
m
us
th
av
e
a
ri
gh
tt
o
pr
ov
id
e
ed
uc
at
io
na
ls
er
vi
ce
s.
T
he
sa
m
e
C
ov
er
ed
uc
at
io
n
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
of
th
e
ch
ild
or
ch
ild
re
n
at
an
y
ed
uc
at
io
na
l
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
w
ith
in
th
e
R
us
si
an
Fe
de
ra
tio
n.
A
ls
o,
ed
uc
at
io
na
l
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
m
us
th
av
e
a
ri
gh
tt
o
pr
ov
id
e
ed
uc
at
io
na
ls
er
vi
ce
s.
C
ov
er
ed
uc
at
io
n
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
of
th
e
ch
ild
or
ch
ild
re
n
at
an
y
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
w
ith
in
th
e
R
us
si
an
Fe
de
ra
tio
n.
A
ls
o,
ed
uc
at
io
na
lo
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
m
us
th
av
e
a
ri
gh
tt
o
pr
ov
id
e
ed
uc
at
io
na
ls
er
vi
ce
s.
M
or
e
pr
ec
is
el
y:
1)
Pa
y
fo
re
du
ca
tio
na
ls
er
vi
ce
s
pr
ov
id
ed
by
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
la
nd
m
un
ic
ip
al
ed
uc
at
io
na
l
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
ts
.
1)
Pa
y
fo
re
du
ca
tio
na
ls
er
vi
ce
s
pr
ov
id
ed
by
ed
uc
at
io
na
l
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
ts
th
at
pr
ov
id
e
no
n-
fr
ee
ed
uc
at
io
na
ls
er
vi
ce
s
an
d
ha
ve
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e
ce
rt
ifi
ca
tio
n
an
d
re
ce
iv
ed
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
cc
re
di
ta
tio
n.
1)
Pa
y
fo
re
du
ca
tio
na
ls
er
vi
ce
s
th
at
fo
llo
w
th
e
st
at
e-
ac
cr
ed
ite
d
ed
uc
at
io
na
lp
ro
gr
am
s.
1)
Pa
y
fo
rn
on
-f
re
e
ed
uc
at
io
na
ls
er
vi
ce
s
2)
Pa
y
fo
re
du
ca
tio
na
ls
er
vi
ce
s
pr
ov
id
ed
by
no
n-
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
ts
,w
hi
ch
ha
ve
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e
ce
rt
ifi
ca
tio
n
an
d
re
ce
iv
ed
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
cc
re
di
ta
tio
n.
A
bo
lis
he
d
3)
Pa
y
fo
ro
th
er
ed
uc
at
io
na
ls
er
vi
ce
s,
w
hi
ch
es
ta
bl
is
he
d
by
th
e
R
us
si
an
G
ov
er
nm
en
t.
T
he
sa
m
e
T
he
sa
m
e
T
he
sa
m
e
N
ot
e:
E
du
ca
tio
na
lc
os
ts
ca
n
be
co
ve
re
d
on
ly
fo
rc
hi
ld
re
n
no
to
ld
er
th
an
25
ye
ar
s.
37
Appendix 2
Appendix 2 presents the process of matching procedure in more details using the case of the in-
stantaneous change in housing expenditures as an example.
The first step of the PSM is an estimation of propensity scores. Only those households who
reported their spending on housing at the year of birth of the second child are used (645 out of
1,159 families) since I work within the complete case analysis framework.
Table 16: Correlates of the Propensity Score
(Housing expenditures, at the year of birth of the 2nd child)
Probit Probit
Age of mother 0.077*** 0.081***
(0.017) (0.024)
First child is a boy -0.074 -0.185
(0.108) (0.132)
Birth interval -0.085*** -0.088***
(0.019) (0.025)
Incomet−1 (in log) 0.448***
(0.062)
Education level of mother (Ref: Unfinished secondary education)
Unfinished secondary education
(7-8 grades of school) and extra courses 1.051*
(0.571)
Secondary school diploma 0.483
(0.537)
Vocational secondary education diploma 0.579
(0.539)
Higher education diploma and more 0.512
(0.546)
Constant -0.983** -5.877***
(0.429) (0.960)
Observations 645 484
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In the estimation of the propensity score, two types of variables are used. The first type includes
variables, such as the age of mother, birth interval, and gender of the first child, that filled for all
the households. The second type covers information on mother’s education level and the logarithm
of household’s monthly income, which are both observed in a year before the birth of the second
child.
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This type of correlates may have missing values, because of the absence of information. Then,
the number of households participating in estimation procedure reduces to 484 households. The
first column of Table 16 presents estimation results of the probit model using only correlates of
the first type. As can be noted, the number of observations is 645. The second column stands for
estimation results of the probit model using two types of correlates. Consequently, the number of
observations becomes equal to 484 (PA - 134, NPA - 350).
Due to the high importance of correlates of type two they are kept in the estimation of the
propensity scores.
The second step is a matching procedure. I use the nearest neighbor matching with replacement
with a caliper of 0.05. The matching method applied allows to find one match for each PA and
create a sample of 700 observations (350× 2), because NPA’s can be used as a match to more than
one PA.
